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If there is a ‘platonic world’ M of mathematical facts, what does M contain precisely? I observe
that ifM is too large, it is uninteresting, because the value is in the selection, not in the totality;
if it is smaller and interesting, it is not independent of us. Both alternatives challenge mathemat-
ical platonism. I suggest that the universality of our mathematics may be a prejudice hiding its
contingency, and illustrate contingent aspects of classical geometry, arithmetic and linear algebra.
Mathematical platonism [1] is the view that mathe-
matical reality exists by itself, independently from our
own intellectual activities.1 Many top level mathemati-
cians hold this view dear, and express the sentiment that
they do not “construct” new mathematics, but rather
“discover” structures that already exist: real entities in
a platonic mathematical world.2 Platonism is alternative
to other views on the foundations of mathematics, such
as reductionism, formalism, intuitionism, or the Aris-
totelian idea that mathematical entities exist, but they
are embodied in the material world [5].
Here, I present a simple argument against platonism
in mathematics, which I have not found in the literature.
The argument is based on posing a question. Let us as-
sume that a platonic world of mathematical entities and
mathematical truths does indeed exist, and is indepen-
dent from us. Let us call this worldM, for Mathematics.
The question I consider is: what is it reasonable to expect
M to contain?
I argue that even a superficial investigation of this
question reduces the idea of the existence ofM to some-
thing trivial, or contradictory.
In particular, I argue that the attempt to restrict M
to “natural and universal” structures is illusory: it is
the perspectival error of mistaking ourselves as univer-
sal (“English is clearly the most natural of languages”.)
In particular, I point out contingent aspects of the two
traditional areas of classical mathematics: geometry and
arithmetic, and of a key tool of modern science: linear
algebra.
Michelangelo’s stone and Borges’ library
Say we take a Platonic stance about math: in some ap-
propriate sense, the mathematical world M exists. The
expressions “to exist”, “to be real” and similar can have
1 For an overview, see for instance [2].
2 Contemporary mathematicians that have articulated this view
in writing include Roger Penrose [3] and Alain Connes [4].
a variety of meanings and usages, and this is a big part
of the issue, if not the main one. But for the sake of
the present argument I do not need to define them—nor,
for that matter, platonism—precisely. The argument re-
mains valid, I think, under most reasonable definitions
and usages.
So, what does M include?
Certainly M includes all the beautiful mathemati-
cal theories that mathematicians have discovered so far.
This is its primary purpose. It includes Pythagoras’ the-
orem, the classification of the Lie groups, the properties
of prime numbers and so on. It includes the real num-
bers, and Cantor’s proof that they are “more” than the
integers, in the sense defined by Cantor, and both pos-
sible extensions of arithmetic: the one where there are
infinities larger than the integers and smaller than the
reals, and the one where there aren’t. It contains game
theory, and topos theory. It contains lots of stuff.
ButM cannot include only what mathematicians have
discovered so far, because the point of platonism is pre-
cisely that what they will discover tomorrow already ex-
ists in the platonic world today. It would not be kind to-
wards future mathematicians to expect thatM contains
just a bit more of what we have already done. Obviously
whoever takes a Platonic view must assume that in the
platonic world of math there is much more than what
has been already discovered. How much?
Certainly M contains, say, all true (or at least all
demonstrable) theorems about integer numbers. All pos-
sible true theorems about Euclidean geometry, including
all those we have not yet discovered. But there should
be more than that, of course, as there is far more math
than that.
We can get a grasp on the content of M from the ax-
iomatic formulation of mathematics: given various con-
sistent sets A1,A2, ... of axioms, M will include all true
theorems following from each An, all waiting to be dis-
covered by us. We can list many sets of interesting ax-
ioms, and imagine the platonic worldM to be the ensem-
ble of theorems these imply, all nicely ordered in families,
according to the corresponding set of axioms.
But this is still insufficient, because a good mathemati-
cian tomorrow could come out with a new set of axioms
2and find new great mathematics, like the people who dis-
covered non-commutative geometry, or those who defined
C∗ algebras did.
We are getting close to what the platonic world must
contain. Let us assume that a sufficiently universal lan-
guage exist, say based on logic. Then the platonic world
M is the ensemble of all theorems that follow from all
(non contradictory) choices of axioms. This is a good
picture of whatM could be. We have found the content
of the platonic world of math.
But something starts to be disturbing. The resulting
M is big, extremely big: it contains too much junk. The
large majority of coherent sets of axioms are totally ir-
relevant.
Before discussing the problem with precision, a couple
of similes can help to understand what is going on.
(i) During the Italian Renaissance, Michelangelo
Buonarroti, one of the greatest artists of all times, said
that a good sculptor does not create a statue: he simply
“takes it out” from the block of stone where the statue
already lay hidden. A statue is already there, in its block
of stone. The artists must simply expose it, carving away
the redundant stone [6]. The artist does not “create” the
statue: he “finds” it.
In a sense, this is true: a statue is just a subset of
the grains of stone forming the original block. It suffices
to take away the other grains, and the statue is taken
out. But the hard part of the game is of course to find
out which subset of grains of stone to leave there, and
this, unfortunately, is not written on the stone. It is se-
lection that matters. A block of stone already contained
Michelangelo’s Moses, but it also contained virtually any-
thing else –that is, all possible forms. The art of sculp-
ture is to be able to determine, which, among this virtual
infinity of forms, will talk to the rest of us as art does.
Michelangelo’s statement is evocative, maybe pow-
erful, and perhaps speaks to his psychology and his
greatness. But it does not say much about the art of the
sculptor. The fact of including all possible statues does
not confer to the stone the immense artistic value of all
the possible beautiful statues it might contain, because
the point of the art is the choice, not the collection. By
itself, the stone is dull.
(ii) The same story can be told about books. Borges’s
famous library contained all possible books: all possible
combinations of alphabet letters [7]. Assuming a book is
shorter than, say, a million letters, there are then more
or less 3010
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possible books, which is not even such a
big number for a mathematician. So, a writer does not
really create a book: she simply “finds” it, in the platonic
library of all books. A particularly nice combinations of
letters makes up, say, Moby-Dick. Moby-Dick already
existed in the platonic space of books: Melville didn’t
create Moby-Dick, he just discovered Moby-Dick...
Like Michelangelo’s stone, Borges’s library is void of
any interest: it has no content, because the value is in
the choice, not in the totality of the alternatives.
The Platonic world of mathematics M defined above
is similar to Michelangelo’s block of stone, or Borges li-
brary, or Hegel’s “night in which all cows are black”3:
a mere featureless vastness, without value because the
value is in the choice, not in the totality of the possibil-
ities. Similarly, science can be said to be nothing else
than the denotation of a subset of David Lewis’s possible
worlds [9]: those respecting certain laws we have found.
But Lewis’s totality of all possible world is not science,
because the value of science is in the restriction, not in
the totality.
Mathematics may be called an “ensemble of tautolo-
gies”, in the sense of Wittgenstein. But it is not the
ensemble of all tautologies: these are too many and their
ensemble is uninteresting and irrelevant. Mathematics is
about recognizing the “interesting” ones. Mathematics
may be the investigation of structures. But it is not the
list of all possible structures: these are too many and
their ensemble is uninteresting. If the world of mathe-
matics was identified with the platonic world M defined
above, we could program a computer to slowly unravel it
entirely, by listing all possible axioms and systematically
applying all possible transformation rules to derive all
possible theorems. But we do not even think of doing so.
Why? Because what we call mathematics is an infinites-
imal subset of the huge worldM defined above: it is the
tiny subset which is of interest for us. Mathematics is
about studying the “interesting” structures.
So, the problem becomes: what does “interesting”
mean?
Interest is in the eye of the interested
Can we restrict the definition of M to the interesting
subset? Of course we can, but interest is in the eyes of
a subject. A statue is a subset of the stone which is
worthwhile, for us. A particular combination of letters
is a good book, for us. What is it that makes certain
set of axioms defining certain mathematical objects, and
certain theorems, interesting?
There are different possible answer to this question,
but they all make explicit or implicit reference to features
of ourselves, our mind, our contingent environment, or
the physical structure our world happens to have.
This fact is pretty evident as far as art or literature are
concerned. Does it hold for mathematics as well? Hasn’t
mathematics precisely that universality feel that is at the
root of platonism?
3 Hegel utilized this Yiddish saying to ridicule Schelling’s notion
of Absolute, meaning that –like mathematical platonism– this
included too much and was too undifferentiated, to be of any
relevance [8].
3Shouldn’t we expect —as often claimed— any other
intelligent entity of the cosmos to come out with the same
“interesting” mathematics as us?
The question is crucial for mathematical platonism,
because platonism is the thesis that mathematical enti-
ties and truths form a world which exists independently
from us. If what we call mathematics ends up depending
heavily on ourselves or the specific features of our world,
platonism looses its meaning.
I present below some considerations that indicate that
the claimed universality of mathematics is a parochial
prejudice. These are based on the concrete examples
provided by the chapters of mathematics that have most
commonly been indicated as universal.
The geometry of a sphere
Euclidean geometry has been among the first pieces of
mathematics to be formalized. Euclid’s celebrated text,
the “Elements” [10], where Euclidean geometry is beauti-
fully developed, has been the ideal reference for all math-
ematical texts. Euclidean geometry describes space. It
captures our intuition about the structure of space. It
has applications to virtually all fields of science, technol-
ogy and engineering. Pythagoras’ theorem, which is at
its core, is a familiar icon.
It is difficult to imagine something having a more “uni-
versal” flavor than euclidean geometry. What could be
contingent or accidental about it? What part do we hu-
mans have in singling it out? Wouldn’t any intelligent
entity developing anywhere in the universe come out with
this same mathematics?
I maintain the answer is negative. To see why, let me
start by recalling that, as is well known, Euclidean ge-
ometry was developed by Greek mathematicians mostly
living in Egypt during the Hellenistic period, building on
Egyptians techniques for measuring the land. These were
important because of the Nile’s floods cancelling borders
between private land parcels. The very name of the game,
“geometry”, means “measurement of the land” in Greek.
Two-dimensional Euclidean geometry describes, in par-
ticular, the mathematical structure formed by the land.
But: does it?
Well, the Earth is more a sphere than a plane. Its
surface is better described by the geometry of a sphere,
than by two-dimensional (2d) Euclidean geometry. It is
an accidental fact that Egypt happens to be small com-
pared to the size of the Earth. The radius of the Earth
is around 6,000 Kilometers. The size of Egypt is of the
order of 1,000 Kilometers. Thus, the scale of the Earth is
more than 6 times larger than the scale of Egypt. Disre-
garding the sphericity of the Earth is an approximation,
which is viable when dealing with the geometry of Egypt
and becomes better and better as the region considered is
smaller. As a practical matter, 2d Euclidean geometry is
useful, but it is a decent approximation that works only
because of the smallness of the size of Egypt. Intelligent
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FIG. 1. Flat and spherical triangles.
beings living on a planet just a bit smaller than ours [11],
would have easily detected the effects of the curvature of
the planet’s surface. They would not have developed 2d
Euclidean geometry.
One may object that this is true for 2d, but not for 3d
geometry. The geometry of the surface of a sphere can
after all be obtained from Euclidean 3d geometry. But
the objection has no teeth: we have learned with general
relativity that spacetime is curved and Euclidean geom-
etry is just an approximation also as far as 3d physical
space is concerned. Intelligent beings living on a region
of stronger spacetime curvature would have no reason to
start mathematics from Euclidean geometry.4
A more substantial objection is that 2d euclidean ge-
ometry is simpler and more “natural” than curved ge-
ometry. It is intuitively grasped by our intellect, and
mathematics describes this intuition about space. Its
simplicity and intuitive aspect are the reasons for its uni-
versal nature. Euclidean geometry is therefore universal
in this sense. I show below that this objection is equally
ill founded: the geometry of a sphere is definitely simpler
and more elegant than the geometry of a plane.
Indeed, there is a branch of mathematics, called 2d
“spherical” geometry, which describes directly the (in-
trinsic) geometry of a sphere. This is the mathemat-
ics that the Greeks would have developed had the Earth
been sufficiently small to detect the effects of the Earth’s
surface curvature on the Egyptians fields. Perhaps quite
surprisingly for many, spherical geometry is far simpler
and “more elegant” than Euclidean geometry. I illustrate
this statement with a few examples below, without, of
course, going into a full exposition of spherical geometry
(see for instance [14, 15]).
Consider the theory of triangles: the familiar part of
geometry we study early at school. In Euclidean geom-
etry, a triangle has three sides, with lengths, a, b and
c, and three angles α, β and γ (Figure 1). We mea-
sure angles with pure numbers, so, α, β and γ are taken
4 It is well known that Kant was mistaken in his deduction that the
Euclidean geometry of physical space is true a priori [12]. But
even Wittgenstein bordered on mistake in dangerously appearing
to assume a unique possible set of laws of geometry for anything
spatial: “We could present spatially an atomic fact which con-
tradicted the laws of physics, but not one which contradicted the
laws of geometry”. Tractatus, Proposition 3.0321 [13].
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FIG. 2. Two points on a sphere determine an arc, whose
size is measured by the angle it subtends, or equivalently,
intrinsically, by its ratio to an equator.
to be numbers with value between 0 and pi. Measuring
with numbers the length of the sides is a more compli-
cated business. Since there is no standard of length in
Euclidean geometry, we must either resort to talk only
about ratios between lengths (as the ancients preferred),
or to choose arbitrarily a segment once and for all, use it
as our “unit of measure”, and characterize the length of
each side of the triangle by the number which gives its
ratio to the unit (as the moderns prefer).
All this simplifies dramatically in spherical geometry:
here there is a preferred scale, the length of the equa-
tor. The length of an arc (the shortest path between two
points) is naturally measured by the ratio to it. Equiv-
alently (if we immerge the sphere in space) by the angle
subtended to the arc. Therefore the length of the side of
a triangle (a, b, c) is an angle as well. See Figure 2. Com-
pare then the theories of triangles in the two geometries
(Figure 1):
Euclidean geometry:
(i) Two triangles are equal if they have equal sides, or
if one side and two angles are equal.
(ii) The area of the triangle is
A = 14
√
2a2b2 + 2a2c2 + 2b2c2 − a4 − b4 − c4.
(iii) For right triangles: a2 + b2 = c2.
Spherical geometry:
(i) Triangles with same sides, or same angles, are equal.
(ii) The area of a triangle is A = α+ β + γ − pi.
(iii) For right triangles: cos c = cos a cos b.
Even a cursory look at these results reveals the greater
simplicity of spherical geometry. Indeed, spherical ge-
ometry has a far more “universal” flavor than Euclidean
geometry.
Euclidean geometry can be be obtained from it as a
limiting case: it is the geometry of figures that are much
smaller than the curvature radius. In this case a, b and c
are all much smaller than pi. Their cosine is well approx-
imated by cos θ ∼ 1 − 12θ2 and the last formula reduces
to Pythagoras’ theorem in the first approximation. Far
from being a structural property of the very nature of
space, Pythagoras’ theorem is only a first order approxi-
mation, valid in a limit case of a much simpler and cleaner
mathematics: 2d spherical geometry.
FIG. 3. Dante’s universe: the Aristotelian spherical universe
is surrounded by another similar spherical space, inhabited
by God and Angel’s spheres. The two spheres together form
a three-sphere.
There are many other beautiful and natural results in
spherical geometry, which I shall not report here. They
extend to the 3d case: the intrinsic geometry of a 3-
sphere. A 3-sphere is a far more reasonable structure
than the infinite Euclidean space: it is the finite homo-
geneous three-dimensional metric space without bound-
aries. The geometry may well be the large scale geom-
etry of our universe [16].5 It shape is counterintuitive
for many of us, schooled in Euclid. But it was not so
for Dante Alighieri, who did not study Euclid at school:
the topology of the universe he describes in his poem is
precisely that of a 3-sphere [19]. See Figure 3. What is
“intuitive” changes with history.
These considerations indicate that the reason Eu-
clidean geometry has played such a major role in the
foundation of mathematics is not because of its uni-
versality and independence from our contingent situa-
tion. It is the opposite: Euclidean geometry is of value
to us just because it describes—not even very well—
the accidental properties of the region we happen to in-
habit. Inhabitants of a different region of the universe—a
smaller planet, or a region with high space curvature—
would likely fail to consider euclidean geometry interest-
ing mathematics. For them, Euclidean geometry could
5 Cosmological measurements indicate that spacetime is curved,
but have so far failed to detected a large scale cosmological cur-
vature of space. This of course does not imply that the universe
is flat [17], for the same reason for which the failure to detect
curvature on the fields of Egypt did not imply that that the
Earth was flat. It only shows that the universe is big. Current
measurements indicate that the radius of the Universe should be
at least ten time larger than the portion of the Universe we see
[18]. A ratio, by the way, quite similar to the Egyptian case.
5be a uninteresting and cumbersome limiting case.
Linear algebra
Every physicist, mathematician or engineer learns lin-
ear algebra and uses it heavily. Linear algebra, namely
the algebra of vectors, matrices, linear transformations
and so on, is the algebra of linear spaces, and since vir-
tually everything is linear in a first approximation, linear
algebra is ubiquitous. It is difficult to resist its simplic-
ity, beauty and generality when studying it, usually in
the early years at college.
Furthermore, today, we find linear algebra at the very
foundations of physics, because it is the language of
quantum theory. In the landmark paper that originated
quantum theory [20], Werner Heisenberg understood that
physical quantities are better described by matrices and
used the multiplication of matrices (core of linear alge-
bra) to successfully compute the properties of quantum
particles. Shortly later, Paul Dirac wrote his masterpiece
book [21], where quantum mechanics is entirely expressed
in terms of linear algebra (linear operators, eigenvalues,
eigenvectors...).
It would therefore seem natural to formulate the hy-
pothesis that any minimally advanced civilization would
discover linear algebra very early and start using it heav-
ily.
But it is not the case. In fact, we have a remark-
able counterexample: a civilization that has developed
for millennia without developing linear algebra—ours.
When Heisenberg wrote his famous paper he did not
know linear algebra. He had no idea of what a matrix
is, and had never previously learned the algorithm for
multiplying matrices. He made it up in his effort to un-
derstand a puzzling aspect of the physical world. This
is pretty evident from his paper. Dirac, in his book,
is basically inventing linear algebra in the highly non-
rigorous manner of a physicist. After having constructed
it and tested its power to describe our world, linear al-
gebra appears natural to us. But it didn’t appear so for
generations of previous mathematicians.
Which tiny piece of M turns out to be interesting for
us, which parts turns out to be “mathematics” is far from
obvious and universal. It is largely contingent.
Arithmetic and identity
The last example I discuss is given by the natural num-
bers (1, 2, 3, ...), which form the basis of arithmetic,
the other half of classical mathematics. Natural num-
bers seem very natural indeed. There is evidence that
the brain is pre-wired to be able to count, and do ele-
mentary arithmetic with small numbers [22]. Why so?
Because our world appears to be naturally organized in
terms of things that can be counted. But is this a fea-
ture of reality at large, of any possible world, or is it just
a special feature of this little corner of the universe we
inhabit and perceive?
I suspect the second answer to be the right one. The
notion of individual “object” is notoriously slippery, and
objects need to have rare and peculiar properties in or-
der to be countable. How many clouds are there in the
sky? How many mountains in the Alps? How many
coves along the coast of England? How many waves in a
lake? How many clods in my garden? These are all very
ill-defined questions.
To make the point, imagine some form of intelligence
evolved on Jupiter, or a planet similar to Jupiter. Jupiter
is fluid, not solid. This does not prevent it from devel-
oping complex structures: fluids develop complex struc-
tures, as their chemical composition, state of motion,
and so on, can change continuously from point to point
and from time to time, and their dynamics is governed
by rich nonlinear equations. Furthermore, they interact
with magnetic and electric fields, which vary continu-
ously in space and time as well. Imagine that in such a
huge (Jupiter is much larger than Earth’s) Jovian envi-
ronment, complex structures develop to the point to be
conscious and to be able to do some math. After all, it
has happened on Earth, so it shouldn’t be so improba-
ble for something like this to happen on an entirely fluid
planet as well. Would this math include counting, that
is, arithmetic?
Why should it? There is nothing to count in a com-
pletely fluid environment. (Let’s also say that our Jo-
vian planet’s atmosphere is so thick that one cannot see
and count the stars, and that the rotation and revolu-
tion periods are equal, as for our Moon, and there are
neither days nor years.) The math needed by this fluid
intelligence would presumably include some sort of geom-
etry, real numbers, field theory, differential equations...,
all this could develop using only geometry, without ever
considering this funny operation which is enumerating
individual things one by one.
The notion of “one thing”, or “one object”, the no-
tions themselves of unit and identity, are useful for us
living in an environment where there happen to be stones,
gazelles, trees, and friends that can be counted. The fluid
intelligence diffused over the Jupiter-like planet, could
have developed mathematics without ever thinking about
natural numbers. These would not be of interest for her.
I may risk being more speculative here. The develop-
ment of the ability to count may be connected to the fact
that life evolved on Earth in a peculiar form character-
ized by the existence of “individuals”. There is no reason
an intelligence capable to do math should take this form.
In fact, the reason counting appears so natural to us may
be that we are a species formed by interacting individu-
als, each realizing a notion of identity, or unit. What is
clearly made by units is a group of interacting primates,
not the world. The archetypical identities are my friends
6in the group.6
Modern physics is intriguingly ambiguous about count-
able entities. On the one hand, a major discovery of the
XX century has been that at the elementary level nature
is entirely described by field theory. Fields vary contin-
uously in space and time. There is little to count, in the
field picture of the world. On the other hand, quantum
mechanics has injected a robust dose of discreteness in
fundamental physics: because of quantum theory, fields
have particle-like properties and particles are quintessen-
tially countable objects. In any introductory quantum
field theory course, students meet an important operator,
the number operator N , whose eigenvalues are the natu-
ral numbers and whose physical interpretation is count-
ing particles [23]. Perhaps our fluid Jovian intelligence
would finally get to develop arithmetic when figuring out
quantum field theory...
But notice that what moderns physics says about what
is countable in the world has no bearing on the universal-
ity of mathematics: at most, it points out which parts of
M are interesting because they happen to describe this
world.
Conclusion
In the light of these consideration, let us look back
at the development of our own mathematics. Why has
mathematics developed at first, and for such a long time,
along two parallel lines: geometry and arithmetic? The
answer begins to clarify: because these two branches of
mathematics are of value for creatures like us, who in-
stinctively count friends, enemies and sheep, and who
need to measure, approximately, a nearly flat earth in a
nearly flat region of physical space. In other words, this
mathematics is of interest to us because it reflects very
contingent interests of ours. Out of the immense vastness
of M, the dull platonic space of all possible structures,
we have carved out, like Michelangelo, a couple of shapes
that talk to us. From the immense vastness of M, the dull
platonic space of all possible structures, we have carved
out, like Michelangelo, a couple of shapes that speak to
us.
There is no reason to assume that the mathematics
that has developed later escapes this contingency. To
the contrary, the continuous re-foundations and the con-
stant re-organization of the global structure of mathe-
matics testify to its non-systematic and non-universal
global structure. Geometry, arithmetic, algebra, anal-
ysis, set theory, logic, category theory, and –recently–
topos theory [24] have all been considered for playing a
foundational role in mathematics. Far from being stable
and universal, our mathematics is a fluttering butterfly,
which follows the fancies of inconstant creatures. Its the-
orems are solid, of course; but selecting what represents
an interesting theorem is a highly subjective matter.
It is the carving out, the selection, out of a dull and
undifferentiated M, of a subset which is useful to us,
interesting for us, beautiful and simple in our eyes, it
is, in other words, something strictly related to what we
are, that makes up what we call mathematics.
The idea that the mathematics that we find valuable
forms a Platonic world fully independent from us is like
the idea of an Entity that created the heavens and the
earth, and happens to very much resemble my grandfa-
ther.
—
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